. Based on vital statistics on these elections presented by many Chinese and international scholars and observers, they conclude, "By many indicators, the future of grassroots democracy in China is bright, much as Tianjian Shi foresaw some years ago" (O'Brien and Han, 2009: 360). On the other hand, they see a serious lag in China's rural democratization that "changes in the "exercise of power' (governance) have not kept up with changes in the 'access to power' (elections)" (O'Brien and Han, 2009:359).
. Based on vital statistics on these elections presented by many Chinese and international scholars and observers, they conclude, "By many indicators, the future of grassroots democracy in China is bright, much as Tianjian Shi foresaw some years ago" (O'Brien and Han, 2009: 360) . On the other hand, they see a serious lag in China's rural democratization that "changes in the "exercise of power' (governance) have not kept up with changes in the 'access to power' (elections)" (O'Brien and Han, 2009:359) .
Viewing "the mountain of evidence" in the existing literature, O' Brien and Han point out a general bias in research focusing on procedural study of elections without due attention to governance. This approach "leads analysts to over emphasize form at the expense of content" (O'Brien and Han, 2009: 360) . For the future study, they propose to shift the focus from "access to power" to "exercise of power." To address the research bias and to explain the gap between much improved elections and little improved governance, O'Brien and Han examine the power configuration in the grassroots politics that puts constraints on village committee including township, Party branch and social forces from clans, religious organizations and criminal elements. They come to the conclusion that "…the quality of democracy in much of the countryside remains stubbornly low, mainly because village committees, once an election is over, are situated in a sociopolitical environment that has changed surprisingly little" (O'Brien and Han, 2009: 376) .
The problem with their analysis of institutional constraints is the assumption that popularly elected village committee is an agent for democratic change, only various formal institutions and informal forces around it prevent it from doing so. For various reasons, however, elected officials in many villages do not try to govern democratically.
In their study of the effect of the incentive structure-mainly the salary-on village officials, James Kung, Yongshun Cai and Xiulin Sun conclude, "when village cadres face competing demands from their families, the village community and the state, they tend to give priority to state tasks first, …and they put community needs last" (James Kung, Yongshun Cai and Xiulin Sun, 2009: 61) . In this study, I will show more factors, personal and structural, for elected officials not to govern democratically or in public interests. Another problem with this approach is that by focusing on the power structure in which village committee is embedded, we cannot learn the actual dynamic of village politics, for example, factionalism, which, I will show below, cuts across these formal institutions or informal groups. When village director and the Party secretary are of the same faction, the institutional divide seems to be meaningless, providing no checks and balances. O'Brien and Han recognize the limit of their institutional approach in the study of village governance and suggest a set of specific questions for further study including "how, when and where elections have changed the relationship between cadres and voters;" "whether elections deter power holders from seeking personal gain above all else;" and whether "limited changes in governance after several rounds of elections a cause of increasing voter apathy" (O'Brien and Han, 2009: 377-378 In their discussion of research methodology, O'Brien and Han, implicitly, while Melanie Manion and Gunter Schubert, directly, call for more case studies. Shubert, in particular, proposes "a new approach" closer to the one used by anthropologists (Schubert, 2009: 387-388) . To address the bias of over-emphasis on procedure rather than content and the imbalance of the field dominated by political scientists it is necessary to have more fine-grained case studies. While anthropological studies of village elections by Chinese scholars are numerous, they are few and far between in the English literature. Zongze Hu published an ethnographical study of a North China village while I made one of a village near Beijing. 5 Different from macro studies that dominate
the field, what a case study can do is to help us discern the causal mechanisms at work, thus enhance our knowledge about how and why these elections work or do not work.
For example, Hu's article analyzes how and why the majority villagers reacted negatively to a good democratic election and supervision, while mine illustrates how and why direct elections led to factional politics and continued popular discontent after the change of leadership. 
Background of the Village and Methodology of the Research
The village (I call it West Village) under study is located 58 kilometers to the northeast of Beijing. It is a large agrarian village with multi-surname groups and a population of over 2,200. The village has 4,300 mu of land, less than half are good for farming, the other half are sandy and stony. For most households, farming is for family consumption rather than the market. In the past two decade, two collective enterprises and two private business of some scale had failed one after another, leaving villagers look for job opportunities outside. Several hundred able-bodied men and some women work in construction or in service industry in the nearby township, the county seat or in Beijing.
According to villagers, the village had been in good shape from the collectivization period through to the reform era of late 1990s. Since then, the village cadres had increasingly worked for themselves. The social, economic and political order of the village has kept deteriorating due to official corruption, poor governance, and rise of unruly villagers, village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs. Thus, West Village can be categorized as a badly governed and dysfunctional village and this study can serve as a test case on whether introduction of democratic elections can or cannot help improve its conditions.
My study covers four direct elections from 2001 to 2010, which villagers consider "free" (hai xuan). To obtain a comprehensive picture of changes and continuities, it is necessary to adopt a time series approach. To achieve a balanced view, it is also necessary to conduct multiple interviews from both members of governing and non- 
Major Findings
Direct elections empowered both the politically ambitious and ordinary villagers at first and resulted in a radical change in the village leadership by removing both the old village director and the old Party secretary. However, new leaders could neither address the accumulated problems left over by the old leadership, nor govern with competency, transparency and accountability. As their expectations for change failed to materialize, villagers' political enthusiasm was soon dampened and replaced by disillusionment, apathy and cynicism.
In contrast, interest in political participation among political and economic elite remained high because of high returns in holding office. Direct elections provided opportunities for an enlarged group of elite to compete for office including both members of the old style political elite (most had served in the village government) and newly emerged economic elite. Competing for power gave rise to strong factionalism and opposition activism, which helped to improve the quality of the first two competitive elections (2004, 2007) and provide a degree of checks and balances to the new leadership.
On the other hand, factionalism reduced the effectiveness of the first new leadership 
Major Players and Factions
The major players and the factions they form in the past four elections in West Village are listed in the order they appear. First, the old village director and the old Party Uncertain about what the first direct election would entail, RW accepted mediation by XM, a predatory entrepreneur and a mutual friend to both candidates: If, according to the gentlemen's agreement, he would not compete this time, the incumbent promised not to compete with him in the next election. Thus the political status quo was maintained through behind-scene politics between the elite involved. However, the popular discontent about the old leadership and the desire for change were expressed loudly and clearly in RW's significant lead in the primary.
The 2004 Election: Downfall of the Old Village Director
When the 2004 election came, the old village director refused to honor the gentlemen's agreement. RW easily built a broad coalition of elite and non-elite supporters to challenge the incumbent. What had transpired in the first competitive election reminded villagers of both sides of the Cultural Revolution and they indeed used the Cultural Revolution vocabulary to describe the struggle as between "the rebels" (zaofan pai) and "the old cadres" (laoganbu).
In the primary, RW led the old village director by about 150 votes. Desperate to win in the formal election, the old village director and his followers resorted to vote buying with petty cash, dinners, and other illegal activities. In the formal election, the old village director got 60 some votes more than RW. RW's supporters would not accept this result.
They put up big character posters accusing the old village director of election fraud.
Further, they demanded investigation of questionable financial deals in recent years.
That was directly aimed at the Party secretary, who had been in control of the village finance. On the day of the run-off election, a group of RW's supporters blocked the entrance to the polling station, making voting impossible.
The crisis alarmed the township leadership, which sent a work team to the village.
When neither persuasion nor intimidation worked, it had to offer the opposition an acceptable compromise. A new election was held and yet another attempt at disrupting the election by the incumbent was aborted. RW finally beat the incumbent by a small margin and became the first popularly elected village chief. In contrast, the support among villagers for RW, the new village director, was eroded for his failure to display strong and capable leadership in dealing with unruly villagers and village toughs. Villagers mentioned several incidents to show that RW was not a good guardian for the village property. Once, he was unable to make a few unruly villagers and village toughs pay for the trees they had illegally cut down. In addition, he failed to sell the recovered trees on the highest bid, thus draining the collective income by several tens of thousands yuan. On another occasion he was unable to collect payment from a few villagers who had used the collective mechanical plowing service. Some villagers' criticism was probably right that RW was a good man but not a principled Both candidates shared the same character flaw in the eyes of villagers--arrogance.
Comparing the two, however, XM had a few advantages in the eyes of villagers: he was over ten years younger; he had more outside connections; (his father, now retired, used to be a section chief of the county police department) and more active young campaigners.
Unlike the previous elections, there seemed to be no clearly good or bad choices for villagers between the two candidates.
I observed the 2007 primary and part of the campaigning process. At least, the primary election, if not its campaigning, 9 was free, fair and competitive. Besides three cadres and two security guards from the township to monitor the election, all the candidates were on site most of the time to keep an eye on the election process. As the memory of the 2004 election crisis was fresh, the procedural rules were well observed this time. Two hours after the booths were closed, the votes were tallied with supporters of both candidates watching: of 1800 eligible voters, about 1200 cast their votes. 
Governance under the Reconstituted Old Cadre Faction
With the benefit of a unified leadership, SL and CF still would not touch the thorny problem of continued erosion and unfair distribution of the village property. Like RW, their lack of political will to enforce regulations and contract terms was mainly out of fear to confront strongmen like XM, Tiger and village toughs. It was also due to the lack of public pressure and support from villagers, who would complain in private but would not raise the issue on formal occasions. As much as the village cadres, villagers were Never finishing his primary school, Tiger is street smart and with some business sense. In the 1990s, he made some money as a broker in transporting and selling cloths from Beijing to Wenzhou. However, his fortune had been made in recent years mainly through his illegal business on the village sand farm. Unlike other predatory entrepreneurs, who engaged in sand business completely illegally, Tiger had actually contracted a sand farm while the old Party secretary was in office, thus at least more legitimate than the others in the illegal business. In the past few years he was further enriched by contracting construction projects both within and outside the village. Being the wealthiest man in the village today, Tiger is also a strongman, commanding respect from village toughs, predatory entrepreneurs and cadres alike. In the construction of the movie theatre and the government office, however, the village director did not seem to have always accommodated him. This contributed to Tiger's determination to replace the incumbent in the upcoming election.
Unlike other village toughs, Tiger seems to be free from bad reputation and even to be admired by some. He is known as a kind of a Water Margin or Chinese Robin Hood figure: some say that he only gives trouble to village cadres but never bothers villagers.
Young men consider him "loyal and generous," (zhangyi) a quality highly regarded by most Chinese. The example they gave was that whenever villagers asked him for some sand for house construction, Tiger would give it to them for free. Tiger has good connections with highest township officials through his sister, who works there as a cook and is known for both being attractive and promiscuous. When he drives to the township, Tiger is treated as a respectable entrepreneur. Whenever there is a crackdown on the illegal business of sand digging, he would be informed ahead of time.
Tiger used both carrot and stick in campaigning. Each household received one hundred yuan before the primary and another hundred before the formal election. To the active supporters of his main opponent, he played tough. Learning the lessons from XM's defeat in the last election, Tiger's followers gathered those who had campaigned for the incumbent last time and threatened them with use of force not to do so this time.
Thus, the reconstituted old cadre faction, the most powerful in village politics, could not effectively function for fear of retribution. In the primary of the 2010 election, four candidates competed, with the incumbent getting about 400 votes and Tiger about 700.
In the formal election, the incumbent's votes dropped to about 200 while Tiger's increased to over 1,200.
Thus, Tiger, a village strongman and a predatory entrepreneur won a landslide victory by using both cash and intimidation. The incumbent also used vote buying but his financial resources simply could not keep up. No doubt Tiger's vote buying played a role, even though we cannot be certain how much. So was his tactics of intimidation, which prevented SL's supporters to effectively campaign for him. But the incumbent's defeat was not a surprise. In the past three elections he competed, the incumbent, on his own, never got more than 300 votes out of 1,200 or above. As village director, his bad temper and rough manner in handling things had upset a number of people and his suspected financial misconduct was even more alienating. Three years in office did not enhance his popular support. Compared the two, many villagers considered Tiger to be a better alternative.
If it was uncertain about how much role cash played in Tiger's rise to power, it was crystal clear that money was everything for another predatory entrepreneur's rise. Dog, Tiger's uncle but a junior partner, was without any redeeming virtues to speak of among villagers. Like his nephew, Dog never finished primary school. After serving in the army, he worked in a private debt collection agency and was said awarded two sets of apartments by the local government for relocating the nail households (daizi hu). After the direct elections began, he began to go back to the village and talked about "getting a little land." Dog is a village tough, pure and simple, with rough manner and foul mouth; yet he could easily win the race by giving 50 yuan to each voter over a two-term incumbent of a decent reputation. In the primary, Dog got only 175 votes while the incumbent got about 500 votes. In the formal election, vote buying gave him 799 votes.
A few elite members of different factions were all very bitter about the rampant vote buying, if not with SL's defeat, calling the CCP leadership and the system "rotten."
Unlike in the election of 2004, in which vote buying by the incumbent aroused a popular protest, no one made a fuss about it in public or reported it to the upper levels. Fear of retribution was certainly a major cause. After all it would be useless since everyone knew that Tiger had good connections in the township and the county. In fact the township was fully aware of vote buying in most elections of its villages. In West Village, the township had three cadres and two security guards on site daily during the election period. Ironically, the township awarded 50,000 yuan bonus to the village leadership for holding a smooth election. Even more ironically, the bonus was given to no one but Tiger, the perpetrator of the rampant vote buying. Instead of handing the money over to the village leadership, he gave it to five of his most hard working campaigners for a tour in the south. "If it's not enough, I'll cover the rest." So much for
Tiger's "loyalty and generosity."
The election changed the power balance in the village leadership, and divided it equally between the village committee controlled by Tiger and Dog with RW tagged along, while the Party branch committee controlled by CF, old village director and a new person used to be CF's driver. With his political ambition, financial strength, strong personality and personal connections in the township, Tigers was predicted to dominate the new leadership. In fact, he had already turned in his application for the Party membership and finished a training session in the township in October. CF was rightly worried about how long he could stay in office as Tiger's predictable next move was either to subdue the Party secretary or to replace him.
The Old and New Problems and Contradictions in the Village
After three competitive elections and four changes of top officials including the change of the Party secretary and the three consecutive changes of the village director, the accumulated problems left by the old leadership before direct elections remained or continued to evolve under the new leadership. In my interviews, the problems repeatedly coming up included: village cadres' questionable business deals and spending, their incompetency to enforce rules and contracts terms, village toughs' and predatory entrepreneurs' encroachment on the village property, in particular, the sand farm, the delinquency on contract dues and the questionable construction deals with village officials. Villagers also wanted to reallocate land, and to develop the collective economy.
These problems of public concern can be summarized as: First, village officials' financial corruption and fiscal irresponsibility; second, village officials' incompetency in maintain a good social and economic order; third, village toughs' and predatory entrepreneurs' growing encroachment on the collective property and fourth, fair redistribution of land and development of the collective economy. All these problems harmed villagers' economic interests and sense of wellbeing, and they wanted village officials to address them. These problems indicate clearly that the main contradictions in the village today are between villagers on one side, and incompetent, corrupt officials, predatory entrepreneurs and village toughs on the other. With Tiger and Dog's election, the hope is even dimmer to address the central concern of the villagers because these two were the greatest beneficiary of the existing unfair and unjust economic and political order. As a smart businessman, it is conceivable that Tiger would give villagers a little more carrot to pacify them just as he did in vote buying. But there is no doubt that he will try to get back his investment and much more.
Discussion and Analysis
How were of the same faction and the village's coffer had never been so abundant. These two leaders were confronted with the same challenge as RW of village toughs' and predatory entrepreneurs' continued encroachment on the village property. Not only did they fail to address this problem, they were, unlike RW, suspicious of financial corruption (Kennedy, 2009: 393) .
In contrast to the decline of villagers' enthusiasm in political participation, interest in elections among the elite remained high because of high returns in holding office. Due to the size of the village and its location in Beijing area, the annual salary for village director, the Party secretary (21,600 yuan) and committee members (14,000 yuan) was five to six times higher than the national average. 16 It is a large sum in rural China, were very fluid and we should be more cautious in making conclusions about them after one or two good or bad ones. It also helps us better appreciate Qingshan Tan's urgent call to create "a national electoral commission, tasked with implementing, supervising and adjudicating village elections" (Tan, 2009: 411) . politics rather than democratic governance in terms of transparency and accountability. In contrast, villagers' early sense of empowerment was replaced by a sense of disillusionment, apathy and cynicism. If we consider the substantive quality of popular participation, the seemingly steady progress in the first three direct elections should be discounted. And the sudden reversal of the 2010 election also makes more sense. After four rounds of direct elections, the beneficiaries were a few members of political and economic elite from holding office and maintaining the unfair socioeconomic status quo.
Conclusion
These findings, as a whole, support the disempowerment argument of direct elections. 6 Those who are interested in the details on this topic can refer to my article (Yao, 2009: 126-144 to be interviewed. Most of interviewees were men of over forty-five years old and were interested in village affairs. Among these, I had formal interviews with 16 people including 2 women, among whom I had more than one session with nine. I also had numerous phone conversations with four informants of different factions in the village for clarity and up-to-date information.
8 XM told me how he had taken advantage of the loopholes in a state owned construction company in collaboration with its production-and-materials coordinator. The coordinator would put in the book an amount of cement that XM did not deliver. Then XM would sell it on the market and shared the income with the coordinator. The illegal ways that XM and Tiger, who would appear later, got rich tell us about the complex composition of rural entrepreneurs, who almost always get positive media coverage. Another entrepreneur of a village near Shijiazhuag I studied had the similar problem.
9 I observed one of XM's campaign workers-a village tough--made phone calls to seek votes with both cajole ("let's have a couple of drinks after the election.") and threat (if you dare not to vote for my No. 3 elder brother, I won't tolerate it."). Of course, it is hard to say how effective this kind of crude campaigning would be. 10 The retired Party branch secretary learned about the deal from his nephew, a village tough and a beneficiary of the deal. According to him, the sum total to be paid to the construction team specified in the contract was 2.53 million. In addition, two leaders promised to pay the village toughs 100,000 yuan for doing small jobs such as digging ditches. They intended to keep the rest in the amount of 80,000 yuan. This kind of financial corruption was common for village leaders in handling large construction projects.
11 When I asked a seemingly capable and principled man serving as the first elected leader of the Villagers' Financial Supervisory Group why he didn't compete for office, his answer was meaningful: "I won't do it because: one, I don't have money (referring to the empty village coffer), two, I don't have connections (referring to the support of the township government), three, I don't know about martial arts (referring to the ability for self-defense against village toughs)."
12 Yu Jianrong and He Qinglian have studied the more serious problem of the rural "dark and evil forces" (hei'er shili), although the demarcation between them and village toughs is not always clear cut and their differences often seem to be a matter of degree rather than of quality. As the "dark and evil forces" can be more harmful and destructive to the social order, they sometimes become the target of the law-enforcement. The village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs in West Village are more akin to the hunhun that Chen studies, whom he aptly categorizes as "a gray force." See (Yu Jianrong, 2005; He, 2006 including "rightful resisters" would make that distinction between local officials and the Party center. (Li, 2004, 228, 248; Kennedy, 2009, 391) . (Hu, 2008: 629-631) . In the English literature, very few scholars who argue the disempowerment effect of direct elections have explored actual election process and post-election governance, herein lies a major contribution of this study.
19 Chen Baifeng refers to the rising problem of village toughs in rural China as "the graying of the rural society," which has driven the political, social and moral order of the village communities to the edge of collapse (Chen, 2008: 209-212) . 20 In the summer of 2010, Beijing municipal and the reconstituted district (still known by villagers as "county") governments worked together to crack down on "evil forces" of village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs in at least two villages. The crackdown and sentencing process received wide media coverage. The two defendants--brothers coming from the village 10 kilometers south of West Village, were charged with illegal business of sand digging and use of violence in village elections and were sentenced to 17 and 8 years in jail respectively with a fine of 2 million each. The crackdown is part of a larger government action and has affected West Village: In October, 2010, the illegal sand digging that had lasted over a decade, which had severely drained the village property and caused environment damage in the area, finally stopped. This recent development
indicates that a determined intervention by the state power can effectively contain, if not resolve, the problem of village toughs.
